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Abstract: Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy
sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the
potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the
game has a unique correlated equilibrium.
1 Introduction
It is well known that games arising from Cournot competition models with linear
demand and linear cost functions have a unique strategic equilibrium. A surpris-
ing result due to Luchuan Liu asserts that these Cournot games also have
a unique correlated equilibrium. This paper generalizes Liu's result. We consider
the class of strategic games that have convex strategy sets, a smooth concave
potential and bounded payoffs. It is shown for this class that the set of correlated
equilibrium coincides with the set of mixtures of pure strategies which maximize
the potential. As a corollary we obtain uniqueness of correlated equilibrium if in
addition the potential is strictly concave.
2 Preliminaries
1. Strategic Equilibrium. A strategic game is a triple (N; (StEN; (hi)iEN)where N is
the set of players and for every player i in N, Si is the set of strategies of player i,
and the payoff function hi is a real valued function defined on S, where S denotes
the cartezian product S = XiENSi.For s in S, hi(s)represents the payoff to player i.
For every sin S, i in N, and every strategy ti in Si we denote by (sIiti) or (sIti) for
short the N-tuple of strategies in S whose ith component is ti and for j i=i, the jth
component equals sj. A point s in S is a pure strategy equilibrium if hi(s) > hi(sIti)
for every ti in Si, and every i in N.
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2. Potential Games. A potential for a game G = (N; (Si)iEN;(hi)iEN) is a real
valued function P on S (P:S -+ IR) such that for every player i, every strategy
profiles in S and every tiin Si,P(sIti)- P(s)= hi(sIti)- hi(s).Apotential gameis
a game that has a potential. Obviously, any point s in S which maximizes
a potential for a game G is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G.
Potential games were introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1994). The
strategic game (N; (Si)iEN;(hi)iEN)' where Si = [0, a/b], a> o and b > 0, and
hi(q1" .., q,l)= (a - bLJ= 1q)qi - Ci(q;), ,C;: [0, a/b] -+ IR a bounded measurable
function, is called the auxiliary game arising from Cournot competition with
a linear price function and arbitrary cost functions Ci(qJ, 1< i < n.Monderer and
Shapley (1994) show that this auxiliary game is a potential game. The function
P((ql,...,qn))=aLJ=lqj-bLJ=lqJ-bL1~i<j~nqiqj-LJ=lC/qj) is a potential
for this game. Note that this potential function P is smooth and concave
whenever the cost functions Ciare smooth and convex, and that the convexity
assumption here on the cost functions Ci'could be replaced by assuming that the
cost functions have second derivatives and b+ «qa > 0. ..
3. Correlated Equilibria. A correlated equilibrium of a game in strategic form
is defined by means of a probability distributions on S = Sl X ... X SIloThus, we
assume a given measurable structure on each Si and assume that the payoffs are
measurable.
A correlated equilibrium of a game G = (N; (Si)iEN;(hi)iEN)is a probability
distribution J1on S = X iENSisuch that for every i in N and every measurable
function ~i:Si -+ si,
L
h'(x)djl(x) >
L
h'(x 11;'(x'))djl(x).
3 The Results
Theorem J.. Let G= (N;(Si)iEN) be a game in strategic form (normal form) with
bounded payofIs, such that:
(1) SI,lEN, are convex.
(2) G has a smooth (C1) concave potential.
Then any correlated equilibrium of G is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which
maximize the potential.
Proof: Let P be a smooth concave potential for G, and let J1be a probability
measure on S= S1 X .., X S". First note that any potential P for a game G with
bounded payoffs is bounded. We will prove that J1is a correlated equilibrium iffCorrelated Equilibrium and Potential Games 225
SsP(x)d,u(x) > Fey) for every y in S. First assume that SsP(x)d,u(x) > Fey) for every
y in S. Then for any measurable f:S ~S,
r
(P(x) - P(f(x))d,u(x) > 0
"s
which implies in particular that for any iEN and any measurable f:S' ~ S'
t
(hi(x) - hi(x If'(x')))dl'(x) ~t
(P(x)
~ P(x Ifi(xi)))dl'(x) > 0
which proves that ,uis a correlated equilibrium.
Next, assume that there exists y in S with
I
P(x)djl(x) < P(y).
As P is concave, for any x in S, the function .s~ P((l - .s)x+ .sy)is concave.
Therefore, the following limit and inequality exist for every x in S,
lim
P((l - .s)x+ .sy)- P(x)
> Fey) - P(x).
o~o+ .s
(1)
Let P(yi_Xi)denote the directional derivation of P in the direction i-Xi. As
y - x = L~ =lyi - Xi and P is smooth,
1
. P((l - .s)x+ .sy)- P(x)
- ~ P . . ( ) 1m -
'--' (y'- Xl) X .
e~O+ .s i=l
(2)
Therefore it follows from (1) and (2) that :L~=1p(y'-xix) > Fey) - P(x), implying
that Ss(:L7=1p(yi-xi)(x))d,u(x) > Ss(P(y) - P(x))d,u(x) > O.Therefore, there exists i
in N with
t
P(y'_~)(x)dJl(x) > O. (3)
For 0<.s < 1,let x; = (1- .s)Xi + syi. The concavity of P implies the concavity
of hi(x[x~ - hi(x) as a function of.s. Therefore, [hi(xlx;) - hi(x)J/.s increases to
P(yi-xi)(x) as .s~O +, and thus by the monotone convergence theorem and (3),
.-
. f
hi(x[x;) - hi(x)
i
hm d,u(x)= P(yi-xi)(x)d,u(x)> O.
e~O S S S
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Therefore, there exists e> 0 such that
f
hi(xlx~)d/1(x) >f
hi(x)d/1(x)
s s
proving that /1:is not a correlated equilibrium.
If SsP(x)d/1(x) > P(y) for every y in S, then P(x) > sup{P(Y):YES} for /1- a.e. x,
thus max{P(Y):YES} exists and for /1-a.e. x P(x)=max{P(Y):YES} and x is
a(purestrategy) Nashequilibrium. .
The following is a straight forward corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary: Let G= (N;(Si\EN;(hi)iEN) be a game in strategic form (normal form)
with bounded payoffs, such that:
(1) 5i, iEN, are convex.
(2) G has a smooth (C1) concave potential P.
Then the set of pure strategy equilibria coincides with arg max P which is
a c.onvexsubset of S.
Theorem 2: Let G= (N;(5i)iEN; (hi)iEN) be a game in normal form, such that:
(1) Si are convex and compact.
(2) G has a (smooth) C1 strictly concave potential.
Then G has a unique correlated equilibria.
ProoF Let x be the unique maximizer of a potential function P for the game G.
Then x is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and by the previous theorem it
follows that xistheuniquecorrelatedequlibrium. .
Remarks: The results assert that ifGhas a concave smooth potential, then the set
of pure strategy equilibria is convex and any correlated equilibrium is a convex
combination of pure strategy Nash equilibria, and that any pure strategy Nash
equilibrium x, maximizes the potential. It is easy to construct a two person game
G ~ith strategy sets [0, IJ having a concave potential, and a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium x that does not maximize the potential. For instance, let P be
the smallest nonnegative concave function on [0, IJ2 with P(1/2, 1/2) = 1,
i.c:, P(x,y)=1-2max(lx-1/21, ly-1/21). Thep. any point (x,y) with
Ix -1/21 = Iy - 1/21is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus the conclusion of
Theorem 1no longer holds if one drops the smoothness assumption. Similarly,Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games 227
one could construct a strictly convex potential on [0, IJ2 with the corresponding
game having multiple equilibria. Indeed, set
P(x,y) = 1- 21y - xl- (x -1/2)2 - (y -1/2)2.
Then the two player game ({1,2}, [0, IJ2, (P, P)) has a strictly concave potential
P which is maximized at the point (1/2, 1/2), and any point (x, y) with x = y is
a pure strategy equilibrium. However, all these equilibrium points (x, x) with
x :/::1/2 lacks some form of stability. It is therefore of interest to look for
a dynamic type theorem which addresses the correlated equilibrium points of
strategic games with a concave potential.
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